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Background. Understanding nosocomial acquisition, outbreaks, and transmission chains in real time will be fundamental to 
ensuring infection-prevention measures are effective in controlling coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in healthcare. We report 
the design and implementation of a hospital-onset COVID-19 infection (HOCI) surveillance system for an acute healthcare setting 
to target prevention interventions.
Methods. The study took place in a large teaching hospital group in London, United Kingdom. All patients tested for SARS-
CoV-2 between 4 March and 14 April 2020 were included. Utilizing data routinely collected through electronic healthcare systems 
we developed a novel surveillance system for determining and reporting HOCI incidence and providing real-time network anal-
ysis. We provided daily reports on incidence and trends over time to support HOCI investigation and generated geotemporal re-
ports using network analysis to interrogate admission pathways for common epidemiological links to infer transmission chains. By 
working with stakeholders the reports were co-designed for end users.
Results. Real-time surveillance reports revealed changing rates of HOCI throughout the course of the COVID-19 epidemic, 
key wards fueling probable transmission events, HOCIs overrepresented in particular specialties managing high-risk patients, the 
importance of integrating analysis of individual prior pathways, and the value of co-design in producing data visualization. Our sur-
veillance system can effectively support national surveillance.
Conclusions. Through early analysis of the novel surveillance system we have provided a description of HOCI rates and trends 
over time using real-time shifting denominator data. We demonstrate the importance of including the analysis of patient pathways 
and networks in characterizing risk of transmission and targeting infection-control interventions.
Keywords.  surveillance; hospital-onset infection; COVID-19; SARS-Cov-2; network analysis.
Within 5 months of its recognition, the novel severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has spread glob-
ally, causing 6.8 million reported cases of coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19) [1]. Dramatic differences in country-specific 
mortality rates (0.5–84 per 100 000) are reported [2] and the 
World Health Organization estimates that 397 000 (5.8%) have 
died of COVID-19 globally [1]. Mortality rates in hospitalized 
patients exceed 26%, with higher rates observed in persons over 
65 years old [3, 4]. Worryingly, COVID-19–associated hospital 
admissions continue to increase, causing unparalleled clinical 
and economic challenges to healthcare settings worldwide.
Nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 acquisition has been reported [5, 
6]; yet, our understanding of transmission dynamics is im-
perfect. Extensive and sustained community transmission, 
presymptomatic transmission, and likely long tail of infection 
suggest unique transmission potential compared with other 
respiratory pathogens [7, 8]. Furthermore, transmission risk 
is amplified by overstretched healthcare capacity, lack of isola-
tion facilities, complex patient pathways, fluctuating supplies of 
personal protective equipment, and use of aerosol-generating 
procedures [9]. It is plausible that uncontrolled nosocomial 
transmissions will challenge pandemic control and fuel peaks 
of infection. Unsurprisingly healthcare worker anxiety around 
healthcare-acquired COVID-19 infection is sizable [10].
Understanding healthcare acquisition and transmission 
chains will be critical for any recovery strategy. The chal-
lenges of capturing dynamic and complex individual patient 
pathways and establishing a pragmatic case definition for 
surveillance must be addressed. Furthermore, the number 
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between healthcare institutions and will depend upon the 
stage of the epidemic.
International bodies have introduced surveillance programs 
to monitor trends in incidence, prevalence, rates of hospitaliza-
tion, and deaths associated with COVID-19 [11, 12]. Recently, 
the UK government mandated surveillance of COVID-19 in-
fections identified in hospitals [13]. While these data are likely 
to provide valuable insights into national epidemiological 
trends, the absence of ward-level data will limit impact on local 
infection-prevention and -control (IPC) interventions. To ad-
dress this, surveillance incorporating factors such as the clinical 
setting and patient pathways is essential.
We designed and implemented a pragmatic, real-time surveil-
lance system for hospital-onset COVID-19 infection (HOCI) 
within our acute healthcare institute prior to the UK govern-
ment mandate. We present the early analysis of the data gen-
erated, based on mapping patient pathways and transmission 
networks, including the identification of healthcare transmis-
sion, and accounting for epidemiological trends in COVID-19 
infection. Furthermore, we highlight how these systems can be 
effectively integrated into national surveillance systems.
METHODS
Setting
The surveillance system was developed and utilized at a large 
London teaching hospital group serving a diverse population, 
comprising 5 hospitals across 4 sites. Our institute has 1200 in-
patient beds, employs 12 000 staff, and undertakes 1.2 million 
episodes of patient contact per year.
The surveillance system was applied between 4 March 2020 
and 14 April 2020. During this time frame 907 patient ad-
missions were identified as COVID-19 positive. The median 
number of new cases per day was 37 (interquartile range [IQR], 
36.3; range, 12.5–48.8). Total daily inpatient admission rates 
varied throughout this period, reflecting bed closures and dy-
namic ward reconfigurations.
Surveillance Case Criteria
Any patient admission tested for SARS-CoV-2 with their first 
positive sample 7 days or more after admission to the hospital 
was included. Patients were tested for SARS-CoV-2 based on 
national recommendations, which at the time of writing were 
any patients requiring admission to a hospital with clinical or 
radiological evidence of pneumonia or acute respiratory dis-
tress syndrome or an influenza-like illness [14]. All patients 
were tested using throat and nasal or nasopharyngeal swabs. 
Diagnosis was made using commercially available real-time 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays.
Definitions
“Daily incidence rate” was assessed by determining patient ad-
missions with and without COVID-19–positive tests. Because 
the incubation period for COVID-19 is fewer than 14 days [7] 
it is plausible that development of symptoms within 14  days 
of hospital admission could be attributed to community ac-
quisition. With a median time to symptoms of 5 days [7], we 
made the pragmatic assumption that symptom development at 
fewer than 7 days was likely to reflect community acquisition, 
and symptom development at days 7–13 more likely reflected 
healthcare acquisition. Consequently, we developed 2 defin-
itions: “HOCI” was defined as any patient with a SARS-CoV-2–
positive test sample 14 days or more after admission and who 
did not have any symptoms of COVID-19 (fever, shortness 
of breath, cough, malaise) on admission. “Possible HOCI” 
(pHOCI) was defined as any patient with a SARS-CoV-2–posi-
tive sample between 7 and 14 days after admission and who did 
not have symptoms of COVID-19 on admission as determined 
by review of electronic patient records. Since our development 
of HOCI classifications, the UK government has provided spe-
cific definitions based on timing between healthcare admis-
sion and positive test [13] consistent with the definitions used 
by Meredith et al [14]. The definitions we developed parallel 
these but include patient-level information, which may provide 
higher-resolution case identification.
“HOCI clusters” were defined as 2 or more cases of HOCI 
or pHOCI occurring on the same ward within 14 days of each 
other.
Surveillance System Development and Implementation
Details are found in Supplementary Appendix 1.  This system 
was developed with input from end-users (IPC teams) and 
clinical leads. To provide clear and usable outputs, unique data 
and visual reports were developed. Data outputs included daily 
patient-admissions rates, daily new confirmed cases of COVID-
19, daily incidence of HOCI, and cumulative HOCI cases over 
time and space.
Network Analysis
Electronic health records were interrogated to produce visual 
reports of inpatient pathways by incorporating into a network 
analysis. The network analysis utilizes directed patient ward 
movements within the preceding 14 days (or up to 14 days in 
cases of pHOCI) from positive COVID-19 results to establish 
2 key inputs: (1) cumulative number of days spent on indi-
vidual wards and (2) number of incoming and outgoing ward 
transfers. These inputs were used to create a graphical repre-
sentation of wards as network nodes, sized to reflect cumula-
tive days spent on the ward and number of HOCI and pHOCI 
cases. Nodes are connected by arrows, or directed edges, with 
a width reflecting the cumulative number of movements from 
one node to another, and their direction. Together, these net-
works visualized patient flows associated with HOCI and 
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RESULTS
Here we report on the early implementation and outputs of our 
HOCI surveillance system.
Prevalence Data
Of 907 confirmed COVID-19–positive patient admissions 
during the analysis period, 90 (9.9%) met our criteria for 
HOCI across 39 wards; 28 were positive 7 to less than 14 days 
after admission (pHOCI) and 62 were positive 14  days or 
more after admission (HOCI). The median number of daily 
cases was 1 (IQR, 0–3). By including patient-level data we ex-
cluded 15 cases where patients had symptoms of COVID-19 
on admission.
Incidence Data
Structured reports of daily incidence were generated and dis-
tributed to IPC teams and management boards on a daily basis. 
Three key metrics on SARS-CoV-2–positive patient admissions 
were reported: (1) numbers and locations of new cases identi-
fied in the preceding 24 hours, (2) daily incidence trends, and 
(3) identification of cases meeting HOCI criteria.
Daily reports highlighted a reduction in hospital inpatient 
admissions coupled with a proportional rise in COVID-19–
positive inpatients (Figure 1A). Strikingly, the proportion of 
HOCI cases remained low. Evaluation of the daily incidence 
of HOCI (Figure  1B) revealed a peak of cases in the third 
week of March, with 73 of 90 (81%) cases identified prior to 
1 April 2020.
Epidemiological Investigation
To support IPC responses, daily reports were augmented with 
ward-level data and 2 visual representations were created as dis-
cussed in the following sections.
Clustering in Time and Space
Prospective data integration allowed real-time HOCI identifi-
cation. Figure 1C provides an example of a geotemporal chart 
generated for individual wards, which can be assessed for clus-
ters. Our cluster definition was met 19 times across 19 different 
wards (involving 70/90 [78%] HOCI and pHOCI cases), in-
cluding ward areas managing patients at higher risk of compli-
cations (renal and hematology).
Where clusters were identified, patient pathways were ana-
lyzed to assess for epidemiological links. The largest cluster 
(ward 14 in Figure 1C) consisted of 13 HOCI cases identified 
on a single medical ward (at times, managing COVID-19–
positive patients in side rooms and cohort bays) over 23 days. 
Figure 2 provides the patient pathway report for this cluster 
and reveals that, while ward 14 was the common location 
where the positive result was identified, many cases shared 
links to other clinical areas. Seven of 13 (54%) patients spent 
time on ward 30, another medical ward, prior to COVID-19 
identification. Furthermore, other medical areas (including 
ward 3)  were common to several patient admission path-
ways and, while most patients were admitted to these areas 
after the positive results, this may reflect broader pathway 
involvement.
Network Analysis
To further assess common epidemiological links, all HOCI 
cases were incorporated into a network analysis. Figure 3A pro-
vides an overview of networks within hospital sites, revealing a 
complete network of all patient movements prior to the iden-
tification of HOCI cases structured by hospital site. The net-
work comprises 49 nodes and 69 edges representing directed 
transfers. The total patient days spent on each ward varied from 
less than 1 day to 123 days, and directed numbers of ward trans-
fers ranged from 0 to 6. Three single points of transfers between 
sites were observed.
At hospital 1, 10 ward areas were identified. The largest node 
(ward 38 in Figure 3A) represents a renal ward that is highly 
connected, in terms of patient ingress, to 2 other renal wards 
(ward 28 and ward 37 in Figure 3A). These wards collectively 
had 8 HOCIs; 6 on ward 38 and 1 each on wards 28 and 37. 
This suggests dynamics within specialty areas, possibly relating 
to accessing hemodialysis facilities.
At hospital 2, 21 ward areas were identified in network anal-
ysis (Figure 3A). Wide variations in patient days on wards were 
observed across these ward areas. The largest node (ward 14 
in Figure 3A) was highly connected to 2 nodes (ward 30 and 
ward 3 in Figure 3A). Wards 14, 30, and 3 are surgical wards 
located within hospital 2 that were being used as medical wards 
during the analytical period, including managing patients with 
COVID-19 in side rooms or cohort bays. In addition to the 13 
HOCIs identified on ward 14, an additional 7 HOCIs were iden-
tified on highly connected ward 30 (n = 3) and ward 3 (n = 3), 
representing 22% of 90 HOCIs identified. In turn, this sug-
gested that IPC interventions were required across all of these 
medical wards and consolidates findings from the geotemporal 
cluster analysis (Figure 1C and Figure 2).
At hospital 3, 18 ward areas were identified in network anal-
ysis. All wards had comparable nodal sizes and, while patient 
transfers connected nodes, there was no dominant node or 
overrepresentation of directional transfers.
Figure  3B provides the network subanalysis of the largest 
cluster on ward 14. Overall, 13 patients with HOCI spent 123 
patient days on ward 14 prior to their positive test for COVID-
19. The analysis highlights that ward 14 was highly connected 
with another medical ward (ward 30), as revealed in Figure 2 and 
Figure 3A. Although overlaying patient pathways (Figure 2) and 
mapping these to a network offer complementary information 
of exposure to prior clinical areas where transmissions could 
have taken place, this subanalysis in Figure 3B does not uncover 
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Figure 1. An example of daily surveillance metrics. A, Total daily patient admissions without a positive COVID-19 test (gray), those with a positive COVID-19 test (light 
gray), and those classified as HOCI and possible HOCI (dark gray). B, The daily incident rate of 90 HOCI and possible HOCI cases identified during the analytical period. C, 
The geotemporal relationship of 90 HOCI and possible HOCI cases during the study period. Each circle represents case(s) of HOCI (gray) and possible HOCI (white) identified 
on wards across the 5 hospitals (wards 1–39) during the analytic period. Each circle is sized to reflect the frequency of cases. Abbreviations: COVID-19, coronavirus disease 
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Supporting National Surveillance Systems
Following the analysis period, the UK government mandated 
institutes to report HOCIs on a weekly basis. In response, out-
puts from our established surveillance system were directly 
linked to national surveillance system databases, permitting 
rapid and seamless uploads. This was combined with estab-
lished infrastructure to support the rapid identification of 
HOCI clusters and epidemiological investigation of individual 
HOCIs with rapid cluster analysis.
DISCUSSION
We have developed and implemented a surveillance system that 
applies network analysis to inform on possible hospital acquisi-
tion and guide IPC interventions. From initial surveillance data 
analysis we have:
• provided a description of HOCI rates and trends throughout 
the COVID-19 epidemic curve using real-time shifting de-
nominator data. We have shown that HOCI and pHOCI 
cases were more common during the early phase of the epi-
demic curve, prior to the peak. Monitoring epidemiological 
trends in real-time provides awareness of the institution’s tra-
jectory within the pandemic which, in turn, provides a plat-
form for future planning,
• highlighted key wards common to patient pathways prior 
to developing HOCI, which may represent hubs of trans-
mission, likely due to frequency of movement through the 
wards, time spent on them, and patient movements to these 
wards;
 • demonstrated the importance of including patient pathway 
network analysis; and
 • shown that linkage to national surveillance systems is 
seamless.
Healthcare-associated infections are frequently defined as de-
velopment of disease more than 48 hours after admission (used 
for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and gram-nega-
tive bloodstream infection and Clostridioides difficile). Due to 
the prolonged incubation period, application of this to HOCI is 
unsuitable. In March 2020 we developed a clinically relevant def-
inition. We proposed that development of infection more than 
14 days after admission reflects healthcare acquisition, while in-
fection identified within the incubation period is less certain. 
Based on the current literature, infections presenting between 
7 and 14 days after admission are more likely to be healthcare 
associated than community acquired, which was reflected in 
our definition. Recently, the UK government announced the 
introduction of a national surveillance system, providing epide-
miological definitions of hospital-onset infections [13]. While 
these pragmatic definitions are likely to be valuable in national 
surveillance, the absence of patient-level data means that it is 
plausible that there will be overreporting of cases.
At the time of writing, no official figures have been pub-
lished on healthcare-acquired COVID-19, and low-quality 
data coupled with heterogenous definitions across clinical 
settings mean that our understanding of HOCI rates is im-
precise. HOCI rates at our institute have varied considerably 
depending on the epidemic stage. Figure 1B reveals that rates 
Figure 2. Reconstructed patient pathways of the largest cluster of HOCI involving 13 cases during the analytical period. The chart represents ward movements up to 
14 days prior to positive sample of the 13 patients (patients 1–13) diagnosed with HOCI or possible HOCI on the same ward (ward 14). The date of first positive SARS-CoV-2 






/cid/article/72/1/82/5868508 by guest on 05 O
ctober 2021
Hospital-onset COVID Surveillance • cid 2021:72 (1 January) • 87
were positively skewed towards the increase in the epidemic 
curve when physical distancing and visitor restrictions had 
not yet been nationally recommended nor implemented lo-
cally. The impact of these measures on the epidemiology 
of this disease remains unclear, but this association gives 
reason to speculate that they may have, at least in part, had 
an impact.
Surveillance systems are widely used to prospectively 
monitor nosocomial infection trends and provide early 
warning signals for outbreaks. These systems commonly 
reflect static ward areas of known patient populations. 
Adapting these to COVID-19 has required flexibility to 
unique and changing circumstances. They must address 
the rapidly shifting nature of inpatients and case mixes 
alongside mapping major patient pathway changes, while 
also encompassing complexities of case definitions, the 




Figure 3. Reconstructed network of patient movement up to 14 days prior to the positive SARS-CoV-2 sample that met the HOCI surveillance definition. Numbers of patient-
days spent on wards (circular nodes) are annotated within each node and represented by the size of the node, which reflects the total cumulative inpatient stay on the ward, 
thus combining information on the number of HOCI and possible HOCI cases who passed through the ward and the time they spent there. Selected wards have been anno-
tated with ward numbers. Arrows (or edges) represent movement between wards and the width reflects the number of patient transfers. Wards are colored by site: hospital 
1 (dark gray), hospital 2 (gray), hospital 3 (light gray). A, A reconstructed network of all HOCIs and possible cases. B, A subnetwork analysis of the largest cluster of 13 HOCI 
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Traditionally, surveillance systems identify the ward area 
(or preceding ward area), where the sample was taken, as 
the geographical target where IPC activity should focus. Yet, 
due to long incubation periods and presymptomatic infec-
tion, involvement of the patient pathway for up to 14  days 
prior to the positive test needs to be considered. Network 
analyses have been previously employed to understand 
infectious-disease transmission and dynamics [15]. To as-
sess geotemporal associations of individuals and HOCI clus-
ters we employed network analysis at a local hospital level. 
Mapping patient pathways to networks reveals clinical areas 
common to HOCI patients’ pathways, offering evidence of 
exposure. We found wards in key specialities overrepresented 
in the HOCI and pHOCI case numbers, suggesting a need 
to analyze patient pathway routes across hospital sites and 
potentially focus IPC interventions on wards earlier in the 
patient pathway. Furthermore, we found that, while net-
work subanalyses identify common pathways, the exclusion 
of patients who test positive on a different ward but share 
pathways underestimates additional key ward exposures. 
This suggests that evaluation of entire networks, rather than 
subanalyses, is likely to provide the most valuable data to in-
form IPC interventions.
Our work has a number of limitations. First, we used the date 
of the first positive sample to reflect the date of infection and have 
not included preceding SARS-CoV-2–negative samples. It is 
possible we have overestimated the incidence of HOCI. Second, 
disease prevalence will affect the positive-predictive value (PPV) 
of the assay; as COVID-19 prevalence decreases, the PPV will 
decrease, which, in turn, can lead to higher false-positive rates. 
Third, healthcare worker samples were not included, so infer-
ences about the role of staff in HOCI are not available. Fourth, 
it is possible that secondary COVID-19 infections could occur 
in patients who have already been diagnosed with COVID-19. 
Our data do not account for these. Fifth, healthcare exposure 
within the 14  days prior to admission, which may contribute 
towards nosocomial acquisition, was not included. Sixth, rou-
tine testing for SARS-CoV-2 at discharge is not performed at 
our institution. Seventh, we screened electronic records of pa-
tients to determine symptoms on admission. Although this 
method is fast, it could have resulted in overinclusion of pa-
tients. Yet, using this method we were able to rule out 15 pa-
tients who were symptomatic on admission. Eighth, while 
network analysis incorporates patient-admission journeys, the 
risk of transmission on wards is not inferred. Furthermore, in 
response to increasing rates, many wards changed to COVID-
19–cohorting wards at short notice, which was challenging to 
disentangle.
Sharing surveillance strategies for adoption by local, na-
tional, and international healthcare groups is essential. We de-
veloped a customizable surveillance system using platforms that 
are globally available and can be integrated with other clinical 
data platforms and national surveillance systems. Further work, 
incorporating healthcare worker sampling, is required to un-
derstand the role of staff in HOCI. It is likely that the higher res-
olution offered by whole-genome sequencing will be required to 
answer this [16].
In conclusion, we present the adoption of a network-analysis 
surveillance system to prospectively identify and characterize 
COVID-19 infections in hospitalized patients. We identified 
varying rates of HOCIs associated with epidemiological changes 
observed through the stages of the pandemic. Through network 
analysis we revealed that examining entire patient pathways is 
fundamental to understand common epidemiological links in 
cases, which, in turn, helps target IPC activities. As we move 
into the recovery phase of the pandemic, more COVID-naive 
patients will be admitted to the hospital. While the opportu-
nity to target hospital interventions may be limited at the height 
of the pandemic, these options will be more achievable in the 
recovery phase and the importance of appropriate triage of pa-
tients along pathways will increase. Preventing transmission 
and acquisition is going to be fundamental for an effective re-
covery, and robust surveillance systems will be key to achieving 
this.
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